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CURENT HALE ROA VOICE AND CONTROL COMMUNICATION 
PRACTICES AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
1.0. OVERVIEW. 
 
This white paper describes, in generic terms, the voice communication and 
aircraft command and control (C2) communication systems and practices used 
by the UAV (Unmanned Air Vehicle) National Industry Team (UNITE) group of 
companies in the operation of their High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) 
Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA). 
 
UNITE is an alliance of companies formed to pursue the common objective of 
creating the capability for ROAs to "file and fly" in the National Airspace System 
(NAS).  UNITE represents several U.S. companies with High Altitude Long 
Endurance UAV experience.  The alliance and its member companies are 
actively participating in the ACCESS 5 program with three federal government 
agencies to achieve the "file and fly" objective.  The UNITE Alliance consists of 
AeroVironment, Aurora Flight Sciences, The Boeing Company, General Atomics 
Aeronautical Systems Inc, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman all of whom 
have contributed technical information in support of this white paper. 
 
 
1.1. OBJECTIVE. 
 
ACCESS 5 is a collaborative alliance between government and industry whose 
vision is, to operate HALE ROAs routinely, safely, and reliably in the National 
Airspace System.  This vision is being achieved through the mission of a 
strategic alliance between government and industry to develop standards, 
regulations, and procedures, develop and demonstrate technologies and define 
and implement initial aviation infrastructure that enable routine access to the 
NAS by HALE ROAs. 
 
The objective of this white paper is to help achieve the ACCESS 5 goal by 
sharing the UNITE members knowledge of current HALE ROA communication 
systems with other ACCESS 5 participants so that all interested parties start from 
a common understanding as we begin the clarification of requirements for voice 
and C2 communication. 
 
This white paper is also intended to describe the point of departure for any future 
developments that need to be realized to achieve the long term ACCESS 5 goal.  
Although this white paper describes the current systems, the functional and 
performance requirements that are also being developed under ACCESS 5 may 
not require the same levels of functionality and performance as currently exist. 
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1.2. INTRODUCTION. 
 
This white paper is divided into the following four sections. 
 
Section 2.0:  A description of a typical current HALE ROA communications 
     system. 
 
Section 3.0:  HALE ROA communications systems performance metrics. 
 
Section 4.0:  HALE ROA communications systems performance. 
 
Section 5.0:  A comparison of current HALE ROA communications systems 
     with current regulations. 
 
HALE ROAs have been in existence for a number of years and have successfully 
logged many tens of thousands of flight hours; however most of these operations 
have been for either military or scientific missions.  The design and operation of 
HALE ROAs has therefore been optimized for these types of mission and not 
optimized for the future civil and commercial roles that the completion of the 
ACCESS 5 goal will allow.  This means that many of the HALE ROA design 
solutions, including their communications capabilities, have not been aimed at 
the same requirements as will be needed to operate HALE ROAs routinely, 
safely, and reliably in the National Airspace System. 
 
A good example of this optimization is the sharing of the wide bandwidth payload 
(cameras, radars, sensors etc.) data link with aircraft C2 and voice 
communication.  This is an effective approach for the current missions flown by 
HALE ROAs but the bandwidth required for the payload data back-haul is far in 
excess of that required to safely and reliably control an ROA.  This white paper 
will not discuss any current payload related data link capabilities but will focus 
specifically on the voice and C2 communications systems required by the 
ACCESS 5 initiative. 
 
One of the corner stones of the ACCESS 5 program is to achieve integration of 
HALE ROAs into the NAS with minimal impact on the current users and 
regulators by adopting as many current manned aircraft practices and 
requirements as is practical, safe and realistic.  However, HALE ROAs do bring 
new and unique challenges to this environment two of which are as a direct result 
of the pilot in command or operator of the aircraft not traveling with the vehicle. 
 
Firstly, compared to a manned aircraft, there must be some additional or different 
communication mechanism for the pilot in command or operators voice to be 
carried to Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) or other pilots of manned or unmanned 
aircraft. 
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Secondly, compared to manned aircraft, there must be some additional 
communications mechanism to allow the pilot in command or operator to control 
the HALE ROA and receive status from the HALE ROA. 
 
Regulations already exist that define the performance for the overall voice 
communication system so the additional or different mechanisms outlined above 
must fall under these requirements.  However, no regulations currently exist that 
cover the additional mechanism for the pilot or operator to control and receive 
status from the HALE ROA. 
 
 
 The following document was prepared by a collaborative team through the noted work 
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2.0. A DESCRIPTION OF A TYPICAL CURRENT HALE ROA 
COMMUNCIATIONS SYSTEM. 
 
This description will be divided into the following four sections. 
 
Section 2.1:  Line Of Sight HALE ROA command and control. 
 
Section 2.2:  Beyond Line Of Sight HALE ROA command and control. 
 
Section 2.3:  Voice Communication. 
 
Section 2.4.  Lost Links. 
 
 
2.1. LINE OF SIGHT HALE ROA COMMAND AND CONTROL. 
 
For Line Of Sight (LOS) communication the maximum distance between the take 
off and landing location, which is usually where the pilot or operator and 
communications equipment are located, and the aircraft is approximately one to 
two hundred miles.  This distance is somewhat arbitrary but is used to 
differentiate between LOS communication and Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) 
communication where additional or more complex communication mechanisms 
are required to allow the aircraft to be flown many hundreds if not thousands of 
miles away from the location of the pilot or operator. 
 
All current HALE ROAs are equipped with LOS C2 data links.  HALE ROAs with 
more autonomy (e.g. automatic take off and landing) rely less on the LOS system 
for take off and landing since the pilot or operator is not “in-the-loop” (actively 
flying the aircraft) but “on-the-loop” (monitoring the flight of the aircraft with the 
capability to override maneuvers if needed) in these systems. 
 
This level of reliance on the LOS system is also reflected in the level of 
redundancy adopted by different HALE ROA systems as well as the importance 
of low C2 data link latency.  All pilot or operator in-the-loop take off and landing 
HALE ROA systems use dual redundant data links and have low pilot control 
input to pilot observable response latencies.  Conversely pilot or operator on-the- 
loop systems often only have single-thread LOS data links and higher latencies. 
 
Dual redundant LOS C2 data links offer two advantages.  Firstly having two sets 
of data link equipment significantly improves the overall reliability (see section 3 
for a definition of reliability) of the data link system since compounded reliabilities 
are squared.  Secondly the two links can also offer improved data link availability 
(see section 3 for a definition of availability).  For example if one of the links is 
temporarily suffering degradation (due to interference or propagation related 
effects) the other link will often be able to take over the delivery of control and 
status data. 
2.2. BEYOND LINE OF SIGHT HALE ROA COMMAND AND CONTROL. 
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Some current HALE ROAs are equipped with Beyond Line Of Sight systems.  
These BLOS systems are all currently satellite based. 
 
Satellites offer very wide geographical coverage areas and allow the aircraft to 
be controlled many thousands of miles away from its take off and landing 
location. 
 
Currently all take off and landing activity is controlled using the LOS systems 
described in the previous section.  However at a manufacturer specific altitude or 
range the ROA is switched from LOS to BLOS control and is usually flown this 
way for the bulk of the distant flight activity.  The pilot or operator using the LOS 
system to control the aircraft does not necessarily have to be the same pilot or 
operator controlling the aircraft using the BLOS system.  A LOS system will again 
be used for landing but not necessarily the same one that was used for take off 
allowing the ROA to make landings at distant locations. 
 
Two types of satellite communication system are currently used.  The first type 
offers truly global coverage (e.g. UHF SATCOM, Inmarsat and Iridium).  Although 
these systems operate at low data rates (100bps to 100kbps) they are still 
adequate to safely control the aircraft.  The second type of satellite system uses 
geostationary satellites that offer higher data rates (1Mbps to 30Mbps) but have 
restricted footprints of coverage on the earth’s surface.  This restricted footprint 
may not be a significant limitation.  For example many of the satellites used are 
designed to provide nation-wide telecommunication capabilities (e.g. PanAmSat 
Galaxy 10R has a footprint that covers all of the Continental United States, 
Alaska and Hawaii).  As a result a HALE ROA can be flown anywhere in the NAS 
from a ground station that can also be located anywhere within the NAS. 
 
Satellite BLOS systems by their very nature have levels of both equipment 
reliability and data link availability that are less than one hundred percent.  To 
compensate for this lack of perfect data link integrity, current HALE ROAs that fly 
BLOS missions utilize multiple (two or three) and different (e.g. global and 
geostationary) satellite communications systems all operating in parallel.  
Typically the flight computer on the aircraft and the computer in the ground 
control station simultaneously monitor all links and choose, on a real-time basis, 
the best link as appropriate.  This link choice can also be manually controlled by 
the pilot or operator. 
 
 
2.3. VOICE COMMUNICATION. 
 
Not all current HALE ROA aircraft carry voice communication equipment.  
However all HALE ROA systems have the ability for their pilot or operator to have 
voice communication with Air Traffic Controllers and pilots of other aircraft. 
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Current HALE ROAs that are only equipped for LOS flights often have their voice 
communication VHF transceiver located in the ground control station.  This is 
adequate when the aircraft cannot fly outside of the coverage area of the ground 
control station based VHF transceiver; however for BLOS operation this is 
unacceptable.  For BLOS missions the VHF voice communication equipment 
must be carried on the aircraft so the pilot or operator can communicate with 
various ATC centers or pilots as the aircraft transits different regions.  In current 
BLOS HALE ROA systems the voice traffic is carried as part of the overall C2 
data link between the ground control station and the aircraft. 
 
Back up systems for voice communication on current HALE ROAs rely on 
telephone connections for LOS only systems and multiple parallel C2 data links 
and often multiple VHF transceivers on BLOS equipped HALE ROAs. 
 
All of the VHF voice equipment currently used for both LOS and BLOS systems 
is standard equipment covered by current TSOs.  However, the method for 
getting the voice traffic between the pilot or operator and the VHF equipment, 
when it is carried by the aircraft flying a BLOS mission, is not specifically covered 
by current regulations.  The methods are only indirectly covered by the fact of 
them being an integral part of the voice communications system so some specific 
performance parameters may need to be developed as part of the ACCESS 5 
program. 
 
 
2.4. LOST LINKS. 
 
Mobile radio communication systems operate under many demanding conditions, 
which lead them to not always be available for their intended purpose.  All mobile 
radio communication systems, including those used on HALE ROAs, are 
designed to achieve a specific level of performance but under certain conditions 
even the best systems can become temporarily unavailable.  These lapses, 
called drop-out periods, which can be caused by multipath fading, airframe 
blockage of the signal, bad weather etc. range in duration from a few 
milliseconds to many minutes.  The amount of time a particular HALE ROA can 
operate without its data links is dependent on its design and level of autonomy.  If 
a drop-out lasts longer than is acceptable to the particular system experiencing 
the loss of communication then a “lost link” situation will be declared. 
 
All HALE ROAs have built in procedures to accommodate Lost Link situations.  
Again the level of autonomy plays a major part in what the ROA does after 
loosing its link, but in most cases the aircraft will fly a pre-planned maneuver 
trying to reestablish any data link that might be available while making its way to 
a pre-coordinated location where it can be picked up again by the LOS system 
located at that facility. 
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3.0. HALE ROA FUNCTION AND PERFORMANC METRICS. 
 
The following is a list of the key performance metrics for HALE ROA voice and 
C2 data links as well as a description of some of the key factors that affect these 
metrics. 
 
 
3.1. AFFORDABILITY. 
 
Although not a classic metric the cost of acquisition and the cost of operation are 
of significant concern in the choice of a data link system.  HALE ROAs are not 
inexpensive.  However, it is certainly true today that the payloads carried by 
HALE ROAs can often cost more than the aircraft themselves.  For example the 
cost of a multiple data link suite, which may be required to meet the high levels of 
availability and reliability needed to fly safely in the NAS, can very quickly add to 
many hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
 
Operational costs are also important.  Geostationary satellite monthly costs as 
well as global satellite costs per minute are high costs that will always be 
significant in any business plan or federally funded operation. 
 
 
3.2. AVAILABILITY. 
 
Mobile radio communications systems face a significant challenge when 
compared to their wired communication counterparts, that of link availability.  
Availability in this context is defined as the percentage of time information can 
flow through working equipment.  It is distinctly different from reliability that 
defines the percentage of time information cannot flow because the equipment is 
broken.  Achieving 100% availability is a major challenge with many factors 
impacting the actual performance. 
 
In principal if more availability is required then more signal power needs to be 
either sent from the transmitter or collected at the receiver so that the factors 
affecting the link availability are less able to degrade the link to the point where 
information cannot be transferred. 
 
Of the many factors affecting data link availability the mobile nature of the aircraft 
and the environmental conditions in which it is flying predominate.  Pointing 
antennas at satellites and ground stations from the mobile aircraft platform is not 
very difficult but minimizing the blockage of the signal by the airframe is often 
very difficult.  For example, since geostationary satellites are located above the 
equator, flying directly north or south often means that the aircraft’s satellite dish 
is pointing through the fuselage and tail of the aircraft.  Although missions can be 
planned around these limitations including these aspects in a “file and fly” 
environment is not practical. 
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All current HALE ROAs have been developed around these limitations.  
Therefore the aircraft does not rely on 100% link availability and only executes a 
“lost link” procedure after a time, which is much longer than the worst case link 
drop-out time.  All current HALE ROA aircraft that fly BLOS use some form of 
autopilot to fly through these link availability drop-outs and have messaging 
protocols that ensure all messages eventually get through even under the most 
arduous of data link conditions. 
 
It should be noted that in some HALE ROA systems that carry the voice 
communication to the aircraft from the ground control station on the C2 data link 
then the data links availability will also affect the availability of the voice 
communication. 
 
 
3.3. CAPACITY. 
 
A significant consideration in the design of any data link system is the capacity it 
has to carry multiple links in the same geographic area or more specifically the 
area over which the transmitted signal would stop another link reusing the same 
frequency. 
 
Current HALE ROA communication systems do not consider capacity as a key 
factor.  But with the growth in HALE ROA flights that will be the result of the 
ACCESS 5 initiative capacity needs to be given a high priority in the definition of 
future data link requirements. 
 
 
3.4. COVERAGE. 
 
Closely aligned with capacity is the coverage of the data link system.  NAS-wide 
coverage can be achieved with one geostationary satellite footprint but then if 
one frequency is being used in one part of the NAS it cannot be reused 
anywhere else.  NAS-wide coverage can also be accomplished by having many 
smaller footprints (or cells) that allow frequency reuse but this requires that each 
cell be somehow linked to all of its neighbors so as to allow seamless hand-off of 
the aircraft as it transits from one cell to the next.  The bottom line is that capacity 
and coverage require a heavy investment in infrastructure (leading back to the 
affordability metric described earlier). 
 
An important consideration in respect of coverage is whether the data link system 
must work over the adjoining regions on the boundaries of the NAS or even allow 
HALE ROAs flying from other regions of the world to transit into US airspace. 
 
 
 
3.5. GRADE OF SERVICE. 
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Grade of Service covers such metrics as latency, voice and data throughput as 
well as voice and data collisions or blockage.  Quality of Service will be defined 
and discussed latter. 
 
For HALE ROAs the most important Grade of Service metric is latency.  There 
are many latencies associated with the control and status as well as voice 
communication system employed by current HALE ROAs. 
 
For a pilot or operator in the loop the latency between them making a control 
input in the ground station and that input being observable as a response by the 
aircraft on their monitor back in the ground station is a key latency.  This is a 
latency that is currently not considered when the pilot in command is traveling 
with the aircraft. 
 
The most important latency from an Air Traffic Controllers perspective is the time 
it takes for the pilot or operator to provide verbal feedback to their verbal request 
to perform a maneuver or supply status or intention. 
 
Both of these latencies can be considered important if the Air Traffic Controller is 
advising the pilot or operator to make a time sensitive safety related maneuver. 
 
Another aspect of the Grade of Service provided by the data link is its ability to 
ensure that no message is blocked by another message.  In the manned flight 
arena this is managed by protocols and procedures observed by the users of the 
service but this is not necessarily possible or so easily achievable with remotely 
piloted or operated ROAs. 
 
 
3.6. MAINTAINABILITY. 
 
In its simplest form maintainability, without a flight engineer/pilot on the ROA 
repairing or working around equipment problems is not as easy.  However other 
aspects of data link maintainability are important.  The majority of HALE ROAs 
do not have environmentally controlled equipment bays so the equipment must 
survive wider extremes of temperature pressure and other environmental 
parameters than would be experienced by equipment used on a manned aircraft. 
 
This will inevitably lead to the need for more frequent inspection and preventive 
maintenance unless, because of the lower likelihood of equipment malfunction 
causing loss of life, a reduction in the reliability of HALE ROA data link equipment 
may be acceptable.  Again affordability becomes a key factor in this equation. 
 
 
 
3.7. OPERABILITY. 
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This metric covers a wide range of parameters.  Two key areas are described in 
the following sub-sections. 
 
3.7.1. Size, weight and power consumption. 
 
Key to all aircraft designs are the SWAP parameters of the payloads.  But with 
HALE ROAs often targeted for long endurance missions the size, weight and 
power of any data link solution are critically important.  While multiple data links 
have a distinct appeal for improving availability and reliability they are certainly 
not attractive from a SWAP perspective. 
 
 
3.7.2. Human Systems Interface. 
 
The more complex multiple data link systems used on HALE ROAs demand a 
much higher level of data link knowledge, training and operational interaction 
than is currently expected of a pilot flying a manned aircraft.  Maintaining a 
geostationary satellite link often requires the full-time attention of both pilot or 
operator and a specialized SATCOM technician. 
 
 
3.8. QUALITY OF SERVICE. 
 
Quality of Service (QoS) metrics include voice readability for the analog voice 
communications system as well as its digital link equivalent Bit Error Rate (BER). 
 
Both metrics define the utility of the received information.  In the digital domain 
there are many precise ways of determining the acceptable BER for a particular 
data link.  However the QoS of analog voice systems has not traditionally been 
so precisely defined. 
 
In HALE ROA systems the voice signals may travel over many more links 
between pilot or operator and ATC personnel or other pilots and under some 
circumstances may even be converted to digital signals and back to analog. So 
defining a metric such as Mean Opinion Score (as used in the wired telephone 
industry) may be required. 
 
 
3.9. RELIABILITY. 
 
As indicated in the section on Maintainability HALE ROA payload equipment 
often operates in much harsher environments than equipment in manned aircraft.  
For example at typical HALE operating altitudes of 40 to 60 thousand feet outside 
air temperatures can drop to as low as -60C to -80C.  Equipment in manned 
aircraft that fly at altitudes of 25 to 40 thousand feet is only required to operate at 
temperatures, as specified by RTCA /DO-160, in the range -20C to -55C.  
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Current HALE ROA data link equipment is also often much more complex than 
the VHF voice equipment or even Inmarsat systems carried by manned aircraft. 
 
Both the harsher operating environment and the higher complexity of equipment 
will make achieving the required levels of reliability harder for the unmanned 
system.  As has been described before current HALE ROAs have often not been 
asked to achieve the levels of equipment reliability required to fly in the NAS so 
some improvements may well be required. 
 
Even if the voice and C2 data links fail all HALE ROA aircraft will perform a pre-
programmed Lost Link procedure to safely as possible bring the aircraft back to a 
know location where it will either land or be landed depending on its level of 
autonomy. 
 
 
3.10. SECURITY. 
 
With the inevitable growth of ROA flights in general and more specifically with the 
impending significant increase in NAS wide activity as a result of the ACCESS 5 
program hi-jacking of ROAs must be considered a potential threat. 
 
Whilst hi-jacking an ROA by overpowering its data link is a distinct possibility 
other threats such as gaining physical access to an ROA control center and hi-
jacking the ROA using its normal C2 facilities or stealing ROA data link 
equipment and using it illegally need to be considered. 
 
There are a number of factors involved in hi-jacking an ROA via its data link.  
These factors are very similar to the factors involved in any military (aircraft, 
missile or communication) jamming scenario or even the threat of jamming or hi-
jacking of commercial or military satellites etc.  Consequently there is a wealth of 
knowledge, both commercial and military, for evaluating and designing data links 
to achieve a specified level of security. 
 
Before hi-jacking can take place the data link itself must be intercepted.  Hi-
jacking can then take the form of either jamming of any future commands to the 
ROA or misdirection of the ROA by sending it false commands. 
 
There are then two further factors that must be considered.  Firstly, the inherent 
security features of the data link system itself and secondly, any additional 
security features that can be added to the data link to make it more robust. 
 
 
 
 
3.10.1. Interception. 
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With the types of ROA data link currently deployed there is some inherent 
protection against finding or intercepting the data link.  Information on the data 
link frequencies being used, the location of the ROA and control station and the 
time when the ROA is airborne are all that will be required to intercept a data link.  
This information can be protected but with the growth of HALE ROA activity this 
information will inevitably become public.  However HALE ROA data links do 
have some resistance to specific interception inherent in their design. 
 
ROA data links use directional antennas to beam the RF power directly at the 
ROA from ground control station and vice versa.  This means that any interceptor 
is disadvantaged because to receive enough signal power the interceptor must 
be very close to the direct path between the two ends of the data link, which is a 
difficult task to physically accomplish. 
 
There are a number of “add-on” techniques that can reduce the likelihood of 
interception.  These techniques also improve the data links resistance to 
jamming and misdirection of the ROA so they will be discussed latter. 
 
 
3.10.2. Jamming. 
 
Once intercepted jamming of the commands to the ROA is the simpler of the two 
hi-jacking techniques.  However because of the design of all ROA data links it will 
not result in a serious situation.  All ROA data links have to be designed to 
accommodate the “unreliable” nature of the RF communications link.  The 
percentage of time that the data link is good is dependent on a number of factors 
but it is always less than 100%.  Because of this the ROA is designed to perform 
a pre-programmed schedule under these lost link conditions. 
 
With the increased level of autonomy and sophistication required by HALE ROAs 
to fly in the NAS (Detect See and Avoid, auto land etc.) lost link situations will be 
easier to work around.  In fact once hundreds of ROAs are flying in the NAS it is 
unlikely that they will all be in continuous communication with their ground 
controllers since there is not enough radio spectrum available for this to occur. 
 
 
3.10.3. Misdirection. 
 
Clearly misdirection of an ROA has the most serious consequences.  However, 
misdirection is also the most difficult to achieve.  Not only must the specific ROA 
data link be intercepted it must also be overridden by the interceptor and then 
false commands must be sent to the ROA.   These manufacturer proprietary and 
unique ROA commands are not public knowledge but with effort could be 
interpreted and used to misdirect an ROA.  What is simpler is just to record and 
then replay a command sequence that would not be appropriate in a different 
situation.  For example bank left instead of bank right or dive instead of climb. 
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Again the higher levels of sophistication required by HALE ROAs to fly in the 
NAS will to some extent counteract the use of malevolent commands.  For 
example, for general safety reasons, the ROA flight computer will be designed to 
not allow the aircraft to fly close to the ground in places other than at a, GPS 
accurate, approved location such as the runway of an ROA certified airport or fly 
close to another aircraft whilst en-route.  These safety related design aspect will 
clearly reduce the likelihood of malevolent commands causing misdirection. 
 
 
3.10.4. Additional Techniques. 
 
There are a wide range of add-on techniques that can significantly improve the 
inherent ability of an ROA data link to withstand deliberate misuse.  These 
techniques either make the RF signal harder to detect or to overpower or if the 
former occurs then make the data itself more robust against interpretation and 
reuse.  As described earlier these techniques are well established and their 
effectiveness can be calculated. 
 
Reducing the power spectral density of the data link RF signal (spread spectrum 
and frequency hopping) will combat RF interception and overpowering of the true 
commands by false commands.  Adding data encryption techniques will protect 
the commands themselves from being interpreted or inappropriately reused. 
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4.0. CURRENT HALE ROA COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE. 
 
This section discusses current HALE ROA communications systems 
performance based on the typical systems described in Section 2 and the metrics 
defined in Section 3. 
 
 
4.1. AFFORDABILITY. 
 
Current HALE ROAs utilize a wide range of voice and C2 communications 
equipment.  As has been discussed earlier HALE ROA voice equipment is 
frequently identical with equipment used in manned aircraft so from a cost 
perspective is no different. 
 
The bandwidth required in either LOS or BLOS systems for just HALE ROA 
control (and not payload back-haul) is modest and so the equipment required for 
this should also not be prohibitively expensive.  However current 
implementations are expensive because of the sharing of the wide band payload 
back-haul discussed previously. 
 
Any satellite based system is going to be expensive from an operational 
perspective.  Geostationary satellite time costs in the order of $5,000 per 
Megahertz per month and global satellite (Inmarsat or Iridium) service costs 
approximately $1.0 per minute.  Both of these costs can be reduced with special 
contracts but these items will always be significant in any operational cost model. 
 
 
4.2. AVAILABILITY. 
 
As was discussed earlier multiple parallel links of different types are used in all 
BLOS based systems primarily to improve availability.  Typically commercial 
satellite data link availabilities (geostationary or global) are in the order of 99.50% 
for a satellite to fixed earth station data link.  Two (identical) links in parallel 
would then yield 99.997500% (“four nines”) availability and three links 
99.999987% (“six nines”).  In operation this level of availability is not achieved 
due to the vagaries of the mobile nature of the aircraft.  Little data exists to 
support operational availabilities in an aeronautical environment.  
 
Information on LOS data links is also not readily available but from the 
experience of the UNITE HALE ROA operators it is reasonable to project similar 
best case availabilities to the BLOS calculation performed above. 
 
A key factor in understanding the effect of availability is the amount of time the 
link is unavailable during a link drop-out.  These drop-out times can range from a 
few milliseconds to many seconds depending on the type of link being used and 
the exact nature of the cause of the link drop-out.  Longer drop-outs occur less 
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frequently.  Any drop-out longer than 20 to 30 seconds is almost certainly the 
beginning of a lost link condition or possible equipment malfunction. 
 
If these temporary drop-out conditions are not going to cause a major problem to 
the operators of the system then it may be reasonable to assume that the static 
link availabilities cited above are achieved even in the mobile HALE ROA 
environment.  It is certainly true that the much more frequent drop-outs of less 
than 200 to 300 milliseconds may not even be noticed. 
 
File and fly access to the NAS will require the C2 communications system to 
support various aspects of ROA situational awareness (Conflict Avoidance etc.)   
Current characterization of the link availability and drop-out statistics is not 
adequate to precisely predict the performance of the C2 link in this respect.  
Funding of the capture of availability and drop-out data should be considered as 
part of the future ACCEES 5 program. 
 
 
4.3. CAPACITY. 
 
As described previously capacity is driven by frequency availability and 
frequency reuse distance. 
 
Current HALE ROA LOS and BLOS systems operate mainly in the microwave 
bands at either L Band (circa 1,600MHz), S Band (circa 2,300MHz), C Band 
(circa 5GHz) or Ku Band (circa 14GHz).  The total amount of bandwidth available 
in any of these bands is in the order of 200 - 500MHz but it must be shared with 
many other users. 
 
Currently there is no dedicated HALE ROA C2 data link frequency band. 
 
As a first approximation and again based on the UNITE members operational 
experience the C2 and voice communication needs of a HALE ROA can be 
satisfactorily supported with a data link transmission bandwidth of well below 
100kbps.  If this is taken as an upper bound then ten ROAs could be controlled in 
every megahertz of available spectrum, including some allowance for guard 
bands between each channel to avoid interference. 
 
If we project into the future when perhaps 1,000 ROAs could be simultaneously 
transiting the NAS then 100MHz of bandwidth would need to be available to 
control them.  It would certainly appear reasonable to assume a more 
sophisticated cellurarized network (similar to other NAS communications 
networks) could be developed so that frequency reuse distances of 300 - 500 
miles were achieved leading to a total bandwidth requirement to simultaneously 
fly 1,000 HALE ROAs in the NAS of only 10 - 20MHz.  
 
Of course there may not be enough frequency to support a thousand HALE 
ROAs each transmitting many Megahertz of payload data but it is unlikely that all 
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HALE ROA activity in the future is going to focus on this type of mission.  Many 
other types of mission that require no real-time high data rate back-haul such as 
cargo transport and agricultural will be possible once file and fly access to the 
NAS is achieved. 
 
 
4.4. COVERAGE. 
 
Current HALE ROA BLOS systems certainly have the ability to cover the entire 
Continental United States with their voice and C2 communication links.  However 
the current systems would certainly be challenged if they were required to fly to 
Alaska or Hawaii.  Again this is partly due to the current systems supporting the 
voice and C2 data links on the much wider bandwidth payload back-haul data 
links.  These wide band links can only be supported on geostationary satellites 
that do not have oceanic or sometimes even littoral coverage. 
 
If a dedicated low data rate voice and C2 data link is considered then more 
mechanisms exist to support this type of system many of which can give truly 
global coverage. 
 
 
4.5. GRADE OF SERVICE. 
 
As was discussed previously latency is probably the most important aspect of 
this group of metrics. 
 
Current pilot or operator control and one way ATC voice communication HALE 
ROA Line Of Sight (as would be typically used in the take off and landing phases 
of a flight) latencies are in the range of 50 to 100 milliseconds.  These latencies 
can be longer, by approximately another 100 to 200 milliseconds, if the voice or 
video is digitized during transmission. 
 
Current pilot or operator control input to observable response latencies for HALE 
ROA Beyond Line Of Sight operation can vary from 0.7 to 1.3 seconds. 
 
Current one way ATC voice communication to pilot or operator HALE ROA 
Beyond Line Of Sight latencies can vary from 300 to 600 milliseconds. 
 
Voice and data throughput and blockage are currently not factored into ROA 
communication systems design but once more ROAs start using the NAS then 
these parameters will drive the capacity and bandwidth requirements of the C2 
system as well as begin to impact the capacity of the ATC system. 
 
 
4.6. MAINTAINABILITY. 
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Current HALE ROAs do not take special steps to deal with maintainability.  The 
majority of the systems are either supported by military logistics organizations or 
are experimental in nature.  In both cases maintenance is carried out either by 
specialized personnel or by swapping equipment with known working equipment 
and returning any faulty equipment to a specialized technical center.  This 
technical center is very likely to be the location where the equipment was initially 
designed and manufactured. 
 
Certainly in the future equipment will be required with higher levels of Built in 
Test that would allow the pilot or operator on the ground to make a detailed 
assessment of the status of the system during flight and act accordingly.  
Maintenance schedules and diagnostic routines will also need to be developed to 
allow regular ground crew to support the ROA with ease of equipment 
replacement and short repair times being key criteria. 
 
 
4.7. OPERABILITY. 
 
4.7.1. Size, weight and power consumption. 
 
Current HALE ROAs have overall payload capacities of between 20 and 50cuft in 
volume can carry between 100 and 500lbs of payload and have between 500 
and 5,000Watts of power available for payloads. 
 
Current HALE ROA LOS data link aircraft systems including antennas are 
typically 1 to 3cuft in volume, weigh 20 to 40lbs and require 100 to 350Watts of 
power.  All well within the capabilities of the HALE ROA. 
 
Current HALE ROA BLOS data link aircraft systems including antennas are 3-
5cuft in volume, weigh approximately 100 to 150lbs and consume approximately 
300 to 1,000Watts of power.  Again all well within the capabilities of the HALE 
ROA. 
 
Although HALE ROAs can accommodate the current data link equipment the 
equipment does use approximately 20 to 40% of the payload capacity of the 
aircraft, which may not be acceptable for all future HALE ROA applications and 
certainly reduces the endurance of the aircraft since less fuel can be carried. 
 
The size, weight and power requirements of a voice and C2 only data link will be 
less than the figures quoted above that are for data link systems that also 
support payload data back-haul.  A reasonable projection for a voice and C2 only 
data link would be 1 to 2cuft in volume, 20 to 30 lbs in weight and requiring 100 
to 200 Watts of power. 
 
 
4.7.2. Human Systems Interface. 
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Current HALE ROA voice and C2 communications systems are not highly 
automated and can occasionally add significantly to the pilot or operators 
workload.  Because ROA systems have amassed less operational experience 
than their manned counterparts a human operator is still needed to manage 
unexpected circumstances or anomalous behaviors when they occur.  For similar 
reasons even highly autonomous ROA systems still require the full time support 
of an operator.  Many current ROA data links also require the full time attendance 
of a data link technician. 
 
The majority of the Human Systems Interfaces are via computer consoles where 
the pilot or operator has control over frequency selection and other data link 
parameters and can monitor data link performance and act accordingly.  The 
screens associated with the Data Link are part of the overall HSI for managing 
the ROA and provide warnings to the pilot or operator if parameters are out of 
range. 
 
 
4.8. QUALITY OF SERVICE. 
 
All HALE ROA voice communication systems utilize standard VHF transceivers 
that provide identical performance to their manned counterparts.  Because of the 
relaxed requirements for voice distortion and Signal to Noise defined in TSO-169 
and RTCA/Do-186A it is unlikely that any current HALE ROA voice system will 
fail to comply with these performance requirements even with the addition of the 
extra communication links required to connect the pilot or operator to the ROA in 
BLOS situations. 
 
Typical Bit Error rates range from one error every one thousand bits (1x10-3) to 
one error every one million bits (1x10-6).  At these error rates the information 
delivered will be adequate for its intended purpose.  Most current HALE ROA 
data links employ error correction or detection as well as the ability to resend 
information if it was corrupted during its initial transmission.  This additional 
processing increases the message error rate to easily better than one error every 
billion (1 x10-9). 
 
 
4.9. RELIABILITY. 
 
The majority of current HALE ROA C2 data links support much more bandwidth 
and are therefore frequently more complex than would be required to safely 
control a HALE ROA. 
 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) for Line Of Sight data links, which as 
described previously are all dual redundant, are typically in excess of 100,000 
hours. 
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This translates to the LOS equipment completely failing approximately once 
every 10,000 ten hour missions. 
 
Mean Time Between Failures for global satellite data link equipment are typically 
in the 3,000 to 6,000 hour range.  Mean Time Between Failures for the more 
complex geostationary satellite data links can be as low as 1,000 hours. 
 
Current HALE ROAs typically use multiple Beyond Line Of Sight data links to 
compensate for these low MTBFs.  Combining two satellite based BLOS systems 
with for example 1,000 and 3,000 hour MTBFs will result in an overall MTBF of 
3,000,000 hours. 
 
This translates to the BLOS equipment completely failing approximately once 
every 300,000 ten hour missions. 
 
In practice there are many unpredictable reasons why the data links may fail that 
are not specifically equipment related.  Under these circumstances other 
mechanisms such as the lost link procedure will take over. 
 
 
4.10. SECURITY. 
 
The consequences of hi-jacking of HALE ROAs are too serious to ignore.  In the 
Reliability Work Package under ACCESS 5 the HALE ROAs operational 
reliability is being defined so as to provide less than a certain probability of loss 
of life per flight hour.  Any hi-jacking threat should be considered in a similar 
manner. 
 
There are many well established techniques to calculate and improve the 
security of the data links.  What needs to be performed is a more detailed threat 
analysis and decision made on the acceptable risk so that an appropriate level of 
security can be included in the requirements. 
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5.0. A COMPARISON OF CURRENT HALE ROA COMMUNICATIONS 
SYSTEMS WITH CURRENT REGULATIONS. 
 
 
The following documents have been reviewed in an attempt to find current 
regulations that could be applicable to defining the operation of HALE ROA voice 
and C2 communications systems. 
 
NAS Concept of Operations and Vision for the Future of Aviation. 
 
FAA NAS-SR-1000.  NAS System Requirements Specification by the year 2000. 
 
FAA NAS-SS-1000 Volume I.  NAS System Specification by the year 2000. 
 
ICAO Annex 2 (Rules of the Air, Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation). 
 
ICAO Annex 10 (Aeronautical Telecommunications, Annex 10 to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation). 
 
AIM (Aeronautical Information Manual). 
 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). 
 
RTCA/DO-l86A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards For Airborne 
Radio Communications Equipment Operating Within The Radio Frequency 
Range 117.975 - 137.000 MHz. 
 
RTCA/DO-264, Guidelines for Approval of the Provision and Use of Air Traffic 
Services Supported by Data Communications. 
 
RTCA/DO-258, Interoperability Requirements for ATS Applications Using ARINC 
622 Data Communications. 
 
DOT/FAA/CT-TN03/04.  The Effect of Voice Communications Latency in High 
Density, Communications-Intensive Airspace. 
 
 
In the Far Term vision (2010 and beyond) described in section 4.2.3 of the NAS 
Concept of Operations ROAs performance is described by “To the extent 
practicable, the ROA operates in the same manner as other aircraft during 
respective phases of flight”.  This clearly reinforces the ACCESS 5 goal of 
seamless integration of ROAs.  From this perspective voice and C2 
communications must comply to the extent practicable with current and future 
manned regulations. 
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Of all of the metrics discussed in the previous two sections Availability and 
Latency are currently of the most interest so these will be the focus of the 
remainder of this section. 
 
 
5.1. AVAILABILITY. 
 
NAS-SR-1000 defines three service levels categorized according to the severity 
of the impact of loss of that service on safe separation and control of aircraft. 
 
Critical Services are functions or services which, if lost, would prevent the NAS 
from exercising safe separation and control over aircraft. 
 
Essential Services are functions or services which, if lost, would reduce the 
capability of the NAS to exercise safe separation and control over aircraft. 
 
Routine Services are functions or services which, if lost, would not significantly 
degrade the capability of the NAS to exercise safe separation and control over 
aircraft. 
 
Table 3-6 of NAS-SR-1000 defines Air to Ground Communications (voice and 
data) functions as Critical Services. 
 
Although HALE ROA C2 communication is not covered by NAS-SR-1000 it is 
certainly an Essential if not a Critical Service according to the above definitions.  
The level of autonomy of the HALE ROA will clearly have a significant impact on 
the ability of the HALE ROA to continue to operate safely without an operational 
C2 data link.  With voice recognition and a full non-cooperative collision 
avoidance capability a HALE ROA may be able to continue to respond to Air 
Traffic Controllers and maintain safe separation with minimal risk.  Conversely 
with a man-in-the-loop only HALE ROA loss of the C2 data link is clearly much 
more critical to its continued safe operation.  If the “Critical Service” of voice 
communication is carried on the C2 data link, as is often the practice with current 
HALE ROAs operating Beyond Line of Sight, then this will clearly have an impact 
on the classification of the C2 link as well. 
 
Section 3.8.1 B of NAS-SR-1000 continues to define the requirements of the 
three levels of service in terms of availability, redundancy, period of loss of 
service and frequency of loss of service. 
 
Availability  Critical Services    0.99999 
   Essential Services    0.999 
   Routine Services    0.99 
 
Redundancy.  No single failure of equipment, system, installation or facility shall 
  cause loss of service to the user/specialist. 
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Single Loss of Service Duration Critical Services 6 seconds 
     Essential Services 10 minutes 
     Routine Services 1.68 hours. 
 
Frequency of Loss of Service.  The frequency of occurrence goal for any loss of 
       service shall not exceed one per week. 
 
From the discussion on Availability in section 4.2 of this white paper “five nines” 
availability can be achieved by the use of multiple parallel communications 
mechanisms.  Multiple data links will also achieve the single failure criteria 
required by the above redundancy statement.  Loss of Service Duration and 
Frequency will be dependant on the technology used for the voice and C2 
communication system.  The six second requirement for Loss Of Service is 
approximately the time for the longest temporary link drop-out after which time 
most data link systems have declared a permanent “Lost Link”.  Frequency of 
Loss of Service information for current HALE ROA systems is not readily 
available but with 0.99999 Availability representing six seconds over a week’s 
duration it is probably unlikely that current systems achieve this single loss per 
week criteria.  It should also be clear that with typical missions lasting 10 to 30 
hours the likelihood of a loss of service during any particular mission is low. 
 
 
5.2. LATENCY. 
 
The only latency requirement that exists in a released sense is contained in NAS-
SR-1000. 
 
Section 3.6.1 A5 states that; 
 
“Voice and data communication shall have the following response capabilities: 
 
 a.  Initiation of one-way air-ground voice transmissions shall be possible 
within 250 milliseconds of keying the specialist microphone. 
 
 b.  The ground-air transmission time for data messages shall not exceed 6 
seconds.” 
 
However other systems such have VDL Mode 3 (Very High Frequency Digital 
Link Mode 3) that digitally implement both voice and data communication 
between ATC and aircraft have similar 175 to 250 millisecond requirements on 
both up and down link latencies. 
 
Further valuable information is contained in a report issued in January 2003 
called “The effect of Voice and Communications Latency in High Density, 
Communications-Intensive Airspace”.  This report concludes that one-way delays 
of up to 350 milliseconds did not significantly degrade the service that was 
provided compared to the current analog delays of below 200 milliseconds.  The 
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report also concluded that delays in the region of 750 milliseconds had a 
noticeable effect on the ATC operator.  This report is focused on High Density 
Communications-Intensive situations such as near busy airports.  It is probable 
that longer communications latencies would not have such a significant effect in 
less communication-intensive situations. 
 
No regulations currently exist that define the latency associated with the pilot in 
command performing any aircraft maneuvers.  This is an area that will need 
review in the case of HALE ROAs. 
 
From the discussion on Latency in section 4.5 of this white paper the LOS one 
way ATC voice communication latencies for current HALE ROA systems are very 
similar to the latencies for systems such as VDL Mode 3.  However BLOS one 
way ATC voice communications latencies for current HALE ROA systems can 
extend up to the 750 millisecond times that caused some degradation in ATC 
service noted in the referenced report. 
 
 
5.3 OTHER METRICS. 
 
Of the remaining metrics discussed in Sections 3 0 and 4.0 Quality of Service, 
Reliability and Security are three important parameters whose performance limits 
need to be determined and regulated. 
 
Quality of Service parameters can be found in RTCA/DO-l86A, Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards For Airborne Radio Communications 
Equipment Operating Within The Radio Frequency Range 117.975 - 137.000 
MHz.  The limits for voice communication Distortion (<7.5%), Noise Level 
(<25dB), Frequency Response (<6dB from 350Hz to 2500Hz) and Hum Level (< 
40dB) given in RTCA/DO-186A are almost certainly met by all current HALE 
ROA voice communication systems since the majority of the equipment used is 
approved under TSO-C169 (or its predecessors C38d and C37d) that cites DO-
186A as its technical standard.  The additional communications link required to 
pass the voice traffic from the ground to the aircraft in BLOS situations is unlikely 
to degrade the voice performance to unacceptable levels. 
 
Reliability may not need to be specifically defined as Availability is covered under 
published regulations but the Security requirements for future HALE ROA 
systems need to address as was described in Sections 3.10 and 4.10 of this 
white paper. 
 
 
